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BACKGROUND 
During FY95 a Software Reliability Engineering (SRE) handbook and a training plan were developed 
for the Marine Corps Tactical System Support Activity (MCTSSA) by the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). 
This handbook contained a process for the Marine Corps to implement and operate SRE in its software 
development, test, and operational evaluation activities. The purpose of SRE is to improve the reliability of 
fielded systems and to treat today's Multi-Function Distributed Systems (MFDS) in a realistic manner for 
the purpose of software reliability modeling and prediction. 
SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES 
This handbook applies only to software defects and failures and system failures that are caused by 
software failures. Hardware failures are excluded. Also the model only includes predictions of software 
reliability and predictions of system reliability that are based on predictions of software failures [SCH97b, 
SCH961. Predictions of hardware reliability are excluded. Interestingly, in the Marine Corps' LOGAIS 
system (a logistical system to support amphibious operations), which is used as an example application, 
4084 (88.3 percent)of the 4584 defects were attributed to software [HEI96]. In this handbook, "user" refers 
to the user of this handbook. 
The objectives of the handbook are to provide a guide for the user to accomplish the following functions: 
o Understand the need for a MFDS model. 
o Understand the terminology of SRE as applied to a MFDS. 
o Understand the structure of the MFDS model. 
o Collect, analyze, and classify defect and failure data. 
o Specify software reliability requirements for a MFDS. 
o Make software reliability predictions for a MFDS. 
o Interpret the results of reliability predictions. 
o Make decisions about software reliability and system reliability (e.g., the system is ready to deploy or, 
conversely, it requires more testing). 
The following major computations are made by the user: 
o Node Failure Probabilities: Boolean search and count operations performed on the defect database. 
o Time to Failure Prediction: Automated in the SMERFS tool [MHB96]. 
o System Failure Probability: Automated in the Statgraphics tool WHB961. 
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NEED FOR A MFDS MODEL 
Popular software reliability models treat software as a single entity and model the failure process in 
accordance with this perspective. However in a MFDS, with multiple clients and servers, this approach is 
not applicable. Consequently a software reliability model was developed that takes into account the fact that 
not all software defects and failures result in system failures in a client-server system. In this model there 
are critical clients and servers: clients and servers with critical functions (e.g., network communication) that 
must be kept operational for the system to survive. There are also non-critical clients and servers with non- 
critical functions (e.g., email). These clients and servers also act as backups for critical clients and servers, 
respectively. The system does not fail unless all non-critical clients fail and one or more critical clients fail, 
or all non-critical servers fail and one or more critical servers fail. 
MCTSSA required the development of such a model because the MFDS is the type of system that is 
developed by this agency, where valid predictions of software reliability are important for evaluating the 
reliability of systems that will be deployed in the field. In addition to the development of a prediction model, 
it was important to develop an approach to specifying software reliability requirements for client-server 
systems. These requirements must be stated in terms that recognize the difference between critical and non- 
critical functions and that a software defect leading to a software failure does not necessarily result in 
a system failure. Furthermore the prediction methodology and the approach for specifjring s o h a r e  
reliability requirements must be consistent. 
The first version of this model, which was developed in FY95, included critical and non-critical clients 
but did not make this distinction for servers; all servers were treated as critical. The latest version, developed 
in FY96, eliminates this restriction to allow for non-critical servers. Furthermore, when making reliability 
predictions, no distinction was made regarding the severity of software defects and failures. The current 
version categorizes the defects according to severity and its effect on the occurrence of software and system 
failures and makes predictions for each category. This modification has resulted in a significant increase in 
prediction accuracy and also provides the software manager with better visibility of software quality as the 
software is being developed and tested. This was accomplished despite the fact that the LOGAIS database -- 
the source of defect data for this project -- does not contain true software failure data (i.e., failures recorded 
in CPU time or calendar time). The enhanced model replaces the previous model. 
, 
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CLIENT-SERVER SOFTWARE RELIABILITY PREDICTION 
In order to apply this handbook effectively, it is important that the user first understand the principles 
of client-server software reliability prediction and have a firm grasp of the terminology that is used in this 
field. This section provides an introduction to client-server software reliability prediction and provides 
definitions of several important terms. Too often the assumption is made, when doing software reliability 
modeling and prediction, that the software involves a single node. The reality in today's increasing use of 
multi node client-server systems is that there are multiple entities of software that execute on multiple nodes 
that must be modeled in a system context, if realistic reliability predictions and assessments are to be made. 
For example if there are N, clients and N, servers in a client-server system, it is not necessarily the case that 
a software failure in any of the N, clients or N, servers , which causes the node to fail, will cause the system 
to fail. Thus, if such a system were to be modeled as a single entity, the predicted reliability would be much 
lower than the true reliability because the prediction would not account for criticality and redundancy. The 
first factor accounts for the possibility that the survivability of some clients and servers will be more critical 
to continued system operation than others, while the second factor accounts for the possibility of using 
redundant nodes to allow for system recovery should a critical node fail. To address this problem, you must 
identify which nodes -- clients and servers -- are critical and which are not critical. Use the following 
definitions: 
Node: A hardware element on a network, generally a computer, that has a network interface card installed 
"OV951. 
Client: A node that makes requests of servers in a network or that uses resources available through the 
servers pOV951. 
Server: A node that provides some type of network service [NOV95] 
Client-Server Computing: Intelligence, defined either as processing capability or available information, 
is distributed across multiple nodes. There can be various degrees of allocation of computing function 
between the client and server, fkom one extreme of an application running on the client but with requests 
for data to the server to the other extreme of a server providing centralized processing (e.g., mail server) and 
sharing information with the clients pOV951. The terms client-server computing and distributed system 
are used synonymously. 
Critical function: An application function that must operate for the duration of the mission, in accordance 
with its requirement, in order for the system to achieve its mission goal (e.g., the requirement states that a 
military field unit must be able to send messages to headquarters and receive messages from headquarters 
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during the entire time that a military operation is being planned). This type of function operates in the 
network mode, which means that the application requires more than a single client to perform its function; 
thus client to server or client to client communication is required. 
Non-critical function: An application function that does not have to operate for the duration of the mission 
in order for the system to achieve its mission goal (e.g., it is not necessary to perform word processing during 
the entire time that a military operation is being planned). Often this type of function operates in the 
standalone mode, which means that a single client performs the application function; thus client to server 
or client to client communication is not required, except for the possible initial downloading of a program 
from a file server or the printing of a job at a print server. 
Critical clients and servers: Nodes with critical functions, as defined above. These nodes must be kept 
operational for the system to survive, either by incurring no failures or by reconfiguring non-critical nodes 
to operate as critical nodes. 
Non-critical clients and servers: Nodes with non-critical functions, as defmed above. These nodes also act 
as backups for the critical nodes, should the critical nodes fail. 
Software Defect: Any undesirable deviation in the operation of the software from its intended operation, 
as stated in the software requirements. 
Software Failure: A defect in the s o h a r e  that causes a node (either a client or a server) in a client-server 
system to be unable to perform its required function within specified performance requirements (i.e., a node 
failure). 
System Failure: The state of a client-server system, which has experienced one or more node failures, 
wherein there are insufficient numbers and types of nodes available for the system to perform its required 
functions within specified performance requirements. 
CLIENT-SERVER SOFTWARE RELIABILITY SPECIFICATION 
In addition to the importance of modeling the correct system configuration when making reliability 
predictions, it is equally important to state software reliability requirements for a client-server system that 
are meaningful for the actual operational mode of the system. This section introduces the handbook user to 
the subject of client-server software reliability specification. Typically, reliability requirements are stated 
as .999..... What does this mean in operational terms? Technically, according to the IEEE Standard Glossary 
on Software Engineering Terminology [IEE90], it means there is a .999 "probability that an item will 
perform a required function under stated conditions for a stated period of time". What is the "item" in the 
context of a client-server system? The IEEE definition suggests a single entity. In the definition, "function" 
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is singular, whereas in a client-server system there are multiple functions. How do you operationalize the 
requirement of .999? Does it mean that a client should be able to execute a given h c t i o n  99.9 percent of 
the attempts? How critical is this function relative to other functions? How do you allocate .999 among the 
various clients and servers? 
The specification of software reliability for an MFDS must address the following: 1) defintion of critical 
and non-critical functions; 2) definition of what constitutes "success" and "failure" in executing the 
functions; 3) consequences of failure to execute these functions correctly; 4) sequence of function execution; 
and 5) elapsed time in which functions must be completed. With this type of specification in hand, the user 
can map it to a client-server architecture with a defintion of the s o h a r e  and node failure states that would 
cause a system failure. 
MODEL FORMULATION 
By defining System Nodes, Node Failure Probabilities, and Failure States, the user will be able to 
compute the probability of system failure given that a node failure has occurred. Start by defining the number 
and type of MFDS nodes as follows: 
Svstem Nodes 
N,,: 
N,,(t): Number of Non-Critical Client nodes. 
N,,: 
N,,(t): Number of Non-Critical Server nodes. 
The sum of these nodes should equal the total number of nodes: 
Number of Critical Client nodes. 
Number of Critical Server nodes. 
N(t)=Ncc+N,c(t>+Ncs+Nn~(t) - (1) 
As long as the system survives, N,, and N,, are constants because a failure of a critical node will result 
in a non-critical node replacing it, if there is a non-critical node available. A change in software 
configuration may be necessary on the former non-critical node in order to run the failed critical node's 
software. If a critical node fails, the system fails, ifthere are no non-critical nodes available on which to 
run the failed critical node's software. 
In contrast, N,,(t) and N,(t) are decreasing functions of operating time because these nodes replace 
failed critical nodes, and are not themselves replaced, where NJO) is the number of non-critical clients and 
N,(O) is the number of non-critical servers at the start of system operation, respectively. In addition, if a 
non-critical node fails, the function that had been operational on the failed node can be continued on another 
node of this type and the system can continue to operate in a degraded state. When either a non-critical node 
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replaces a critical node or a non-critical node fails, Nnc(t) or N,(t) is decreased by one, as appropriate. 
Node Failure Probabilities 
The user must also account for the following node failure probabilities: 
pcc: probability of a software defect causing a critical client node to fail. 
pnc: probability of a software defect causing a non-critical client node to fail. 
pcs: probability of a software defect causing a critical server node to fail. 
pm: probability of a software defect causing a non-critical server node to fail. 
These probabilities are important to know individually in the analysis; they are also important in the 
computation of the probability of system failure. 
The general function for the probability of system failure by time t, given a node failure, is the following: 
PsyJnode fails (t)=f(Ncc, ~cc, "no Pnc, Ncs, ~cs, Nns, PnJ (2) 
Equation (2) means that the probability of a system failure, given a node failure, is dependent on the four 
node counts and the corresponding four failure probabilities. The four probabilities are computed from data 
that is derived from a defect database (defect descriptions, defect classifications, and administrative 
information) as follows: 
pcc=C,fcc(i)/D, where fcc(i) is the critical client node failure count in interval i; 
pnc=Cifnc(i)/D, where fnc(i) is the non-critical client node failure count in interval i; 
pcs=Cifcs(i)/D, where fcs(i) is the critical server node failure count in interval i; 
p,=Cifns(i)/D, where fns(i) is the non-critical server node failure count in interval i; 
and the total defect count across all intervals is D=C,d(i), 
(3) 
(4) 
( 5 )  
(6)  
(7) 
where i is the identification of an interval of operating time of the software and d(i) is the total defect count 
in interval i. 
The user makes the computations of equations (3)-(6) by summing the number of failures in a given 
category (e.g., critical clients) and dividing by equation (7), the total sofrware defect count in the database. 
The LOGAIS Chronological Defect Count Database is shown in Appendix A. This table is excerpted from 
the entire LOGAIS database to show the essential data necessary for software reliability analysis. The 
LOGAIS Chronological Node Failure Count Database is shown in Appendix B. This table is derived by 
querying the database to find those defects in Appendix A that qualify as node failures. Note that there are 
significantly fewer node failures than there are defect counts, for a given day. Also note that the data in 
Appendices A and B are not true failure data because the defects and failures are not recorded in CPU 
execution time or wall clock time. Rather they are recorded in calendar time in batches, based on 
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administrative convenience. Many of these batches are submitted at the end of a workday. This time 
becomes the "submit date". The details of making these computations will be shown in the Application of 
the Model section. 
In a specific application, Boolean expressions (i.e. expressions containing AND, OR, and NOT, logic 
operations) are used to search the defect database and extract the failure counts (e.g., FCC(I)) that are used to 
compute equations (3)-(6). These expressions specify the conditions that qualify a defect as a node failure 
(e.g., defect that is a General Protection Fault that affects network operations on a Windows-based system). 
Failure States 
Next the user needs to know that at a given instant in test or operational time t, a MFDS may be in one 
of three failure states that pertains to the survivability of the system, as follows, in decreasing order of 
capability: 
Degraded - Type 1: A software defect in a non-critical node causes the node to fail. As a result, the system 
operates in a degraded state, with one less non-critical node. No reconfiguration is necessary because the 
failed node is not replaced. 
Degraded - Type 2: A s o h a r e  defect in a critical node causes the node to fail. As a result, the system 
operates in a degraded state, but one that is more severe than Type I ,  because there would be both a 
temporary loss of one critical node during reconfiguration and a permanent loss of one non-critical node (i.e.> 
one of the non-critical nodes takes over the function of the failed critical node). Under certain conditions -- 
see Table 1 -- this type of node failure can cause a system failure. 
The current version of the model assumes that node failures are not recoverable on the node where the 
failure occurred, during the mission. The next version of the model will contain a repair function to account 
for the case where a node failure is repaired and the node is put back into operation during the mission. 
System Failure: The system fails under the following conditions: 1) all non-critical clients fail and one or 
more critical clients fail, or 2) all non-critical servers fail and one or more critical servers fail. The reason 
for this failure event formulation is that, in the event of a failed critical node, a non-critical node can be 
substituted, possibly with a different software configuration. However, if all non-critical clients (servers) 
fail, and one or more critical clients (servers) fail, there would be no non-critical clients (servers) left to take 
over for the failed critical clients (servers). 
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Svstem Failure Probability 
Having equations (3)-(6) for the node failure probabilities in hand, the model applies them to computing 
the probability of system failure -- equation (1 2). The intermediate equations leading up to equation (1 2) 
follow: 
The probability that one or more critical clients N,, fail, given that the software fails, is: 
P,,= 1 -( 1 -pcc)NCC (8) 
P nc (t)=(p,,)N"C(') (9) 
Pcs= 1 -( 1 -pcs)NCS (10) 
Pns(t>=(Pns>Nm"' (1 1) 
The probability that all non-critical clients Nn,(t) have failed by time t, given that the software fails, is: 
The probability that one or more critical servers N,, fail, given that the software fails, is: 
The probability that all non-critical servers N,(t) have failed by time t, given that the software fails, is: 
Equations (8) and (9) assume that client failures are independent (ie., one type of node failure dots not 
cause another type of node failure). This is the case because a failure in one client's software would not cause 
a failure in another client's software. However it is possible that a failure in server software could cause a 
failure in client soha re ,  such as a client accessing a server that has corrupted data. Also, equations (1 0) 
and (1 1) assume that server failures are independent. This is the case because a failure in one server's 
software would not cause a failure in another server's software. However it is possible that a failure in client 
soha re  could cause a failure in server software, such as a client with corrupted data accessing a server. No 
case of client failures that were caused by server failures nor of the converse have been found in the LOGAIS 
database. Of course, this does not mean that these events could not happen in general. To account for the 
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Does Not Apply Node Failure(s) and Node Failure(s) and 
Node Failure Does Not Apply Does Not Apply 
Does Not Apply Node Failure(s) and Node Failure(s) and 
Nnc(t)>O Nnc(t)=O 
NnS(t)>O Nns(t)=O 
possibility of these events, you would need to include the conditional probability of a client failure, given 
a server failure, and the converse. This model formulation is beyond the scope of this handbook and will be 
included in the next version of the model. 
Combining (S), (9), (1 0), and (1 l), the probability of a system failure by time t, given that a node fails, 
is: 
~sys/node fails (t)=[PccI Pnc(t)I+CPcsI [Pns(t)I=[l -(l-~cc)~""I [@nc)Nnc("'I+[l - P ~ J ~ ~ ~ I  [@nJNn"'"I (12) 
Psw=Pcc+Pnc+Pcs+Pns (13) 
and the probability of a node failure due to s o h a r e  is: 
Note that the user is not required to make the computations for equations (8)-( 1 l), which are shown for 
informational and terminology purposes. The user only computes equation (12), which itself is automated 
as will be shown in the Application of the Model section. 
Model Concepts 
The model concepts are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2, where there are five critical clients, five non- 
critical clients, one critical server, and one non-critical server. Figure 1 shows a surviving configuration, 
where a critical client fails and a critical server fails but there are non-critical clients and a non-critical server 
to take over the functions of the failed nodes. The consequence of this configuration is a Degraded - Type 
2 failure state. Figure 2 shows a failing configuration where there are no non-critical clients and server to 
take over for the critical failing nodes. The consequence of this configuration is a system failure. In both 
figures, for illustrative purposes, both a failed critical client and a failed critical server are shown. A more 
typical case is when only one of the critical nodes fails at a time. 
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Figure 1. Surviving Configuration 








Figure 2. Failing Configuration 
In order to make Time to Failure predictions for each of the four types of node failures, the user first 
analyzes the defect data to determine what type of software defects could cause each of the four types of 
node failures; then the user partitions the defect data accordingly. More will be said about this process in 
the Application ofModel section. Next the user applies equation (14) of the Schneidewind SofhYare 
Reliability Model [AIA93, KEL95, LYU 96, SCH97a, SCH93, SCH921 to make each of the four predictions, 
using the SMERFS software reliability tool [FAR93]. In equation (14), Ttft) is the predicted time (intervals) 
until the next F, failures (one or more) occur, a and p are failure rate parameters, s is the first interval where 
the observed failure data is used, t is the current interval, and X,, is the cumulative number of failures 
observed in the range s,t. 
Time to Failure predictions are made for critical clients, non-critical clients, critical servers, and non- 
critical servers. As the predicted failure times are recorded, the user observes whether the condition for 
system failure, as defined previously, has been met. If this is the case, a predicted system failure is recorded. 
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Thus, in addition to monitoring the types of predicted failures (e.g., critical client), the process also involves 
monitoring N,,(t) and N,(t) to identify the time t when either is reduced to zero, signifying that the supply 
of non-critical clients or non-critical servers has been exhausted. In this situation, a failure of a critical client 
or critical server, respectively, will result in a system failure. Thus the user predicts a system failure when 
the following expression is true (where "A" means "AND" and "V" means "OR"): 
((Predict critical client failure)A(N,,(t)=O))V((Predict critical server failure)A(N,,(t)=O)) (1 5).  
I If the predictions produce multiple node failures in the same interval (e.g., critical client and critical 
I server), the user records multiple failures for that interval. 
APPLICATION OF THE MODEL 
Analysis of the Defect and Failure Data 
In this example the user applies the software reliability model to the Marine Corps LOGAIS system -- 
a client-server logistical support system. In this system it is important that the reliability specification 
distinguish between failure states Degraded-Type I ,  Degraded-Type 2, and System Failure, as previously 
defined (i.e., distinguish between node failures that cause performance degradation but allow the system to 
survive, and node failures that cause a system failure). This distinction is made when analyzing the system's 
defect data. The defect data used in the example are from the LOGAIS defect database, using the Defect 
Control System (DCS), a defect database management system which was used on the LOGAIS project 
[MHB96, MTP961. The network configurations in Figures 1 and 2 are used in this example. 
In this Windows-based client-server system, the types of clients and servers that were previously defined 
are used, with corresponding types of defects and failures, as identified in the defect database [MHB96, 
MTP961. The following short-hand notation for identifying the attributes of the defect database is used: 
o S: Software Defect 
o G: General Protection Fault (GPF) 
o N: Network Related Failure 
o C: System Crash 
The LOGAIS defect database is queried in order to identify the software defects that qualify as node 
failures. The following Boolean expressions, corresponding to the four types of node failures, are used: 
1. Critical Client Failure: COUNT as failures WHERE (SAGANAnotC). A GPF causes a node failure 
(Degraded-Type 2) on a critical client, a client which must maintain communication with other nodes on 
the network (Network Mode), and the failure does not cause a System Crash (loss of server). 
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2. Non-Critical Client Failure: COUNT as failures WHERE (SAGAnotNAnotC). A GPF causes a node 
failure (Degraded-Type I )  on a non-critical client, a client which does not have to maintain communication 
with other nodes on the network (Standalone Mode), and the failure does not cause a System Crash (loss of 
server). 
3. Critical Server Failure: COUNT as failures WHERE (SAnotGANAC). A System Crash causes a node 
failure (Degraded-Type 2) on a critical server, a server which must maintain communication with other 
nodes on the network (Network Mode), and the failure is not a GPF; it is more serious, resulting in the loss 
of a server. 
4. Non-Critical Server Failure: COUNT as failures WHERE (SAnotGAnotNAC). A System Crash causes 
a node failure (Degraded-Type I )  on a non-critical server, a server which does not have to maintain 
communication with other nodes on the network, and the failure is not a GPF; it is more serious, resulting 
in the loss of a server. 
The above classification associates GPF with clients and System Crash with servers; it also associates 
Network Related Failures with critical node failures. Note that this is only an example. For other systems, 
different defect and failure classifications may be appropriate. 
The total failure count is obtained by taking the union of expressions 1 --4 as follows: 
5. Total Failure Count: COUNT as failures WHERE (SA((GAnotC)V(notGAC))). This expression is used 
to verify the correctness of 1--4 because it should equal their sum. 
An example of querying the LOGAIS database for critical client defects that constitute node failures, 
using DCS, is shown in Figures 3 and 4. The first figure shows the selection criteria; the second figure shows 
the defect record of the first defect that satisfies the criteria: Defect # 140 1 , which occurred in Interval 16 
on 11/29/94 (see Appendix B). Appendix B is created by querying the defect database, using expressions 
1 --4, and' counting the occurrences that satisfl the criteria. Note that Appendix B (and Appendix A) are 
created only once; they are updated as new defects and failures occur. 
Observed Ranve and Prediction Ranye 
The major objective of reliability modeling is to predict future reliability over the prediction range of 
test or operational time of a system. However to do so, there must be a historical record of defects and 
failures for computing the model parameters and for making the best fit with the historical data; the data 
is collected during the observed range of test or operational time of a system. The length of the observed 
range is determined by the amount of data that has been collected prior to making a prediction, while the 
length of the prediction range is determined by duration of the system's mission. The observed range in this 
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example is 1,50 intervals and the prediction range is 51,61 intervals for the data in Appendix B. These 
ranges are arbitrary and selected only to illustrate the process. The user should note that once a system has 
been tested or operated over the prediction range, there will be observed defects and failures in this range. 
The observed defects and failures in the prediction range are listed in Table 2. The failure counts 
corresponding to types 1--5, above, are summarized in Table 3, which shows the empirical probabilities of 
node failure that are computed using equations (3)--(7) and (13). For example, for critical clients, the 
computation is 24/4048=.005929. The user should verify the computations for the remaining types of nodes. 
16 
17 
Figure 4. Defect Control System Query Result for Critical Clients 
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Table 2 
LOGAIS Chronological Node Failure Count Database (Sample) 
CC: Critical Client Node Failure 
NC: Non-Critical Client Node Failure 
CS: Critical Server Node Failure 
NS: Non-Critical Server Node Failure 
1. Critical Client 
2.Non-Critical Client 
3.Critical Server 








5. Total I 267 
Number 
p,,=.065705 
51 2633,2634 2 
51 263 5,263 6,263 7,263 8 4 
I I 
52 I 1 
53 266 1,2662,2663,2664 4 
54 264 1,2644,2645,2669, 8 
2671,2672,2673,3003 
54 2640,2643,2670,2674, 7 
2675,2676,2783 
59 25 1 1,25 12,25 13 3 
60 
I I 
61 3025,3 026,3027,3029 I 4 
Table 3 
Summary of Node Failures (4048 Software Defects) 
Application Predictions 
Time to Failure 
Using equation (14) and failure data in the observed range 1,50 (see Appendix B), the user makes 
predictions for Time to Failure, for 0 5 0  days, for critical clients. The predictions are made for a given 
numbers of failures (time to one failure for 0 5 0  days, time to two failures for 0 5 0  days, etc.). The excerpted 
SMERFS session for these predictions is shown in Appendix C. The user should carefully study this 
example. In the case of critical clients, the failure data was sparse; thus a five day interval was used for 
prediction, with these predictions converted to one day intervals as shown in Appendix C. Table 4 shows 
predictions compared with the actual failure data (obtained from Table 2), with the relative error and 
average relative error for cumulative values shown. Both Time to Failure and Cumulative Time to Failure 
(i.e., cumulative total starting with 50 days). It is not necessary for the user to make these comparisons; they 
are shown only to give the user a feel for the accuracy of prediction. 
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Table 4 
Critical Client Predictions Made at Time50 Days 









Time to Cumulative Time Time to Cumulative Time Relative 
Failure to Failure (Days) Failure to Failure (Days) Error 
(Days) (Days) (Percent) 
5.19 55.19 11 61 -9.52 . 
11.07 61.07 11 61 +.11 
17.88 67.88 11 61 +11.28 
25.95 75.95 11 61 +24.5 1 
35.86 85.86 36 86 -.16 
Average 9.12% 
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Similarly, predictions are made for non-critical clients and non-critical servers in Tables 5 and 6,  
respectively. In the case of these non-critical nodes, the failure data is sufficiently dense to allow a failure 
count interval of one day for predictions. In the case of critical servers, there are only two actual failures, 
both of which occur in the observed range (see Appendix B). Only one prediction of Time to Failure for one 
more failure could be made at t=50 for critical servers because the predicted remaining failures at t=50 is 
1.40; therefore, critical server failures are not tabulated. Using SMEWS, the user should verify the results 
in Tables 5 and 6.  
Table 5 
Non-Critical Client Predictions Made at Time=50 Days 






2.41 52.41 1 51 +2.76 
4.87 54.87 1 51 +7.59 
7.37 57.37 3 53 +8.25 
9.92 59.92 3 53 +13.06 
12.52 62.52 3 53 +17.96 
Table 6 
Non-Critical Server Predictions Made at Time=50 Days 
Observed Range=l,5O Days; Failure Count=lOS; Prediction Range50 Days 
I I I Average + 8.30% 
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Using the data in Tables 4-6, the user merges and sequences the various types of failure predictions in 
Table 7. The purpose of this table is to construct the scenario of failures and surviving non-critical nodes 
so that the time of System Failure can be predicted. The table shows that seven node failures (i,e., the 
sequence NS, NC, NC, CC, NC, NC, CC) are predicted to occur before the system is predicted to fail. This 
occurs at e61.07 days when there are no non-critical clients available and a critical client fails. No critical 
server failures are shown in this table because the prediction of Time to Failure of 99.35 days cumulative 
is beyond the prediction range of interest in this example. The user should verify, by examining Tables 4-6, 
that the predicted sequence of Cumulative Time to Failure and Twe of Failure occur as shown in Table 7. 
Table 7 
Predicted Time to Failure When Various Types of Failures are Merged and Sequenced 
Observed Range=1,50 Days; Prediction Range=51,61 Days 
Time to I Failure Cumulative Time to Failure (Days) 
CC: Critical Client 
NC: Non-Critical Client 
NS: Non-Critical Server 
Type of Number of Non- Number of Non- I Failure I Critical Clients Critical Servers 
I 1.96 50 I 
5 1.96 I .45 
5 
I NS I 5 I 0 I 
1 








   
  
NC 3 0 
cc 2 0 
NC 1 0 
NC 0 0 
cc System Failure 
I I  I 1 I 0 I 
Using the data in Table 7, the user plots predicted cumulative failures and number of available non- 
critical clients versus cumulative time to failure in Figure 5. This graph shows the accumulation of node 
failures, with the corresponding reduction in the available non-critical clients, until the maximum allowable 
failures occurs, and the system fails. 
Using the data in Tables 4-6, the user merges and sequences the various types of actual failures in Table 
I I 
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I I I 
I I CC I v  I I 
8. Similar to Table 7, the purpose of this table is to construct the scenario of actual failures and surviving 
non-critical nodes so that the actual time of System Failure can be determined and compared with the 
predicted values. As in the case of the predictions, this table shows that seven node failures (i.e., the 
sequence NC, NS, NC, NC, NC, NC, CC) occur before the system fails. This occurs at t=6ldays when there 
are no non-critical clients available and a critical client fails. No critical server failures are shown in this 
table because they occurred prior to the range of this example. The user should verify, by examining Tables 
4-6, that the actual sequence of Cumulative Time to Failure and Type of Failure occur as shown in Table 
8. 
Cumulative Time Time to 
to Failure (Days) Failure 
Table 8 
Actual Time to Failure When Various Types of Failures are Merged and Sequenced 
Range=51,61 Days 
Type of Number of Non- Number of Non- I Failure I Critical Clients Critical Servers 
CC: Critical Client 
NC: Non-Critical Client 






NC,NS 4 0 









 3 0 
NC 2 0 
NC 1 0 
NC 0 0 
cc System Failure 
I  I  I 
I 61 I I CC I I I 
,,ig the data in Table 8, the user plots actual cumulative failures and number of available non-crika 
clients versus cumulative time to failure in Figure 6. The shape of Figure 6 is caused by multiple failures 
occurring on the same day in some cases. In comparing Figures 3 and 4, the user will see that in each case 
seven node failures are required to cause a system failure and that the system fails on Day 6 1 ; however, the 
supply of non-critical clients becomes exhausted earlier in the actual case. 
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Predicted Cumulative Failures and 
Available Non-Critical Clients 
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Figure 5. Predicted Node and System Failures 
Actual Cumulative Failures and 
Available Non-Critical Clients 
CC: Critical Client, NC: Non-critical Client, Ns: Non-critical Server 
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Curnulatie Time to Next FaWre (Days) 
+ 
Figure 6. Actual Node and System Failures 
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Probability of System Failure 
Lastly, using equation (12), the user predicts the probability of system failure, given a node failure, in 
column 5 of Table 9, as the system progresses through the predicted failure scenario that was shown in 
Table 7 and Figure 5. Except for row 2 in Table 9, the actual probability is the same as the predicted 
probability because the actual failure scenario that was shown in Table 8 and Figure 6 produces the same 
numbers of non-critical clients and servers that are shown in columns 6 and 7, respectively. Because the 
predicted and actual failure scenarios are identical, except for row 2, the predicted time to failure and type 
of node failure, columns 1 and 2, respectively, can be compared in with the corresponding actual values in 
columns 3 and 4, for given probabilities of system failure. These values were reproduced fiom Tables 7 and 
8, respectively. Because for a given Pwinode fails (t), the cumulative time to failure occurs later for the 
predicted values, the model is a bit optimistic with respect to reality for this example. Note that the in the 
last row of Table 9 the system has not yet failed. This occurs when a critical client fails at Day 61.07 
predicted (see Table 7 and Figure 5) and at Day 61 actual (see Table 8 and Figure 6). At this time there are 
no non-critical clients left to replace the failed critical client. 
The computation of equation (1 2) is shown in Appendix D, using Statgraphics. This equation is created 
and saved by using the equation editor of Statgraphics. Then the various input values are loaded and the 
equation is evaluated to produce the probabilities in column 5 of Table 9.The user should verify the 
computations in Appendix D. 
The user should note the significant results that emerge from this analysis. They are: 1) The P,/node 
fails (t) is only significant (.029790) when the supply of both non-critical clients and non-critical servers 
has been exhausted and 2) P,inode fails (t) is significantly lower than the probability of any type of node 
failure caused by a s o h a r e  defect: p,,,,=.065705, obtained from equation (13) and computed in Table 3. 
Thus evaluations of system reliability should recognize that soJtware failures are not necessarily equivalent 
to system failures and that assessments of software reliability that treat every failure as equivalent to a 
system failure will grossly understate system reliability. 
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Table 9 












Predicted Actual Actual Probability Number of Number of 
Type of Cumulative Type of of System Non- Non- 
Node Time to Node Failure Critical Critical 
Failure Failure Failure Given a Clients Servers 
(Days) Node Failure Available Available 
50 0.0000 19 5 1 
NS 0.000494* 5* O* 
NC 51 NC,NS 0.000494 4 0 
NC 51 NC 0.000494 3 0 
cc 53 NC 0.000506 2 0 
NC 53 NC 0.001087 1 0 
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I 6 I 711-888 I 
Defect ID . Number of Submit Date Day 
Range Defects 
1-120 120 1111 1/94 Fri 
178 I 11/16/94 I Wed 
8 
9 
I I I I I 
~ ~~ 
943-98 1 39 11/18/94 Fri 
982-996 15 11/19/94 Sat 
I 7 I 889-942 I 54 I 11/17/94 I Thu 
-1 




I I 5DayTotal I 335 I 
1566- 1624 59 121 1/94 ThU 
1625-1 697 73 12/2/94 Fri 
1698- 1703 6 12/3/94 Sat 
28 
29 
44 2293-2358 66 1/13/95 Fri 
45 2359-2362 . 4 1/14/95 Sat 




51 2425-*** 48 1/24/95 Tue 
Cumulative 2916 
2474-2480 7 1/3 1/95 Tue 
2481-2486 6 2/1/95 Wed 
I 52 I 2426-*** 1 44 
59 
60 
I 1/25/95 I Wed 
25 1 1-2529 19 2/3/95 Fri 
2530-2543 14 2/6/95 Mon 
53 2430-*** 145 1/26/95 ThU 




I I I 
55 2446-2473 28 I 1130195 
Cumulative 2986 
2544* * * 53 2/7/95 Tue 
3040-3067 28 2/8/95 Wed 
3068-3099 32 2/9/95 ThU 
MonI 
65 3111-3137 27 211 3/95 Mon 
5 Day Total 151 
I 
I I 5DayTotal I 492 I 
58 I 2487-2510 I 24 I 2/2/95 I Thu I 
I 5DayTotal I 70 I I I 





r 70 I 3234-3242 I 9 I 2/21/95 I Tue I 
Cumulative 3137 
3 138-3 146 9 21 14/95 Tue 
3147-3167 21 211 5/95 Wed 
3 168-32 13 46 21 1 6/95 ThU 
3214-3233 20 2/17/95 Fri 
~ 






I 75 I 3325-3334 I 10 I 2/28/95 I Tue I 
3243-3260 18 2/22/95 Wed 
3261-33 14 54 2/23/95 ThU 
3315-3320 6 2/24/95 Fri 




I 79 I 3344-3347 I 4 I 3/6/95 I Mon I 
5 Day Total 92 
Cumulative 3334 
3335-3340 6 3/1/95 Wed 
3341 1 3/2/95 ThU 
3342-3343 2 3/3/95 Fri 




I 1 5DayTotal I 15 I I I 
33 50-3362 13 3/8/95 Wed 
3363-3368 6 311 0195 Fri 
3369-3379 11 3/13/95 Mon 
I I Cumulative I 3349 I I I 
~ 
85 33 84-34 19 36 311 5/95 Wed 
5 Day Total 70 
86 
87 
I 84 I 3380-3383 I 4 I 3/14/95 I Tue I 
Cumulative 3419 
3420-343 1 12 3/16/95 ThU 





I I 5DayTotal I 147 I I I 
3448-3492 45 3/20/95 M0n 
3493-3530 38 3/21/95 Tue 






I 5DayTotal I 92 I I I 
Cumulative 3566 
3567-3601 35 3/23/95 ThU 
3602-3616 15 3/24/95 Fri 
3617-3635 19 3/27/95 Mon 
3636-3652 17 3/28/95 Tue 





I 100 I 3727-3731 I 5 I 4/5/95 I Wed I 
Cumulative 3658 
3659-368 1 23 3130195 ThU 
3682-3693 12 3/31/95 Fri 
3694-3710 17 4/3/95 Mon 
371 1-3726 16 4/4/95 Tue 
101 
I 102 I 3770-3840 I 71 I 4/7/95 I Fri I 
5 Day Total 73 
Cumulative 3731 




3 93 3 -3 949 17 41 1 7/95 Mon 
3950-3963 14 411 8/95 Tue 
I I I I I 






~ ~ -~ ~~ - ~~~~ 7 -  
3964-4033 70 411 9/95 Wed 
4034-4079 46 4120195 Thu 
113 
114 
I 119 I 4208-4287 . I 80 I 5/3/95 I Wed 
4080-4107 28 4/25/95 Tue 





I 124 I 4357-4367 1 11 1 5/10/95 I Wed 
4 133-4167 35 4/27/95 ThU 
5 Day Total 204 
Cumulative 4167 
4168-4176 9 4/28/95 Fri 
4 177-41 85 9 5/1/95 Mon 





4288-4320 33 5/4/95 ThU 
5 Day Total 153 
Cumulative 4320 
4321-4328 8 5/5/95 Fri 
4329-4343 15 5/8/95 Mon 
4344-4356 13 5/9/95 Tue 
125 
* Indicates discontinuous sequences of IDS for Submit Date. First ID of first sequence shown. 
Bolding indicates breaks in defect submit dates. 
4368-44 18 51 511 1/95 ThU 







44 19-4504 86 5/12/95 Fri 
4505-45 13 9 5/15/95 Mon 
45 14-45 5 5 42 5/16/95 Tue 
4556-4584 29 51 1 7/95 Wed 
TOTAL 4584 I 
APPENDIX B 
LOGAIS Chronological Node Failure Count Database 
8 
9 
CC: Critical Client Node Failure 
NC: Non-Critical Client Node Failure 
CS: Critical Server Node Failure 
NS: Non-Critical Server Node Failure 
948,954,955,956,957,958,978 
992,993,996 






I 1 2 1  122,285,303,304 
1 3 1  306 






l 6  760,767,768,828,829,835, 836,840,841,842,843,844,876 
‘ I  7 I 890,89 1,927 
I 10 I 997,1022  
1061,1062,1081,1090 
I 12 I 1152,1154 
I 13 I 1234,1235 
I 14 I 
I 15 I 1275,1363 
I l5 1315,1317,1321,1324,1351,1352, 1364,1366,1367 
16 1413 1 
16 1377,1378,1379,1393,1423,1426, 8 
1439,1482 
17 1548,1549 2 
17 1510 1 
17 1511,1535 2 
18 1569 1 
19 1652,1664,1677,1678 4 
19 1665 1 
20 1703 1 
21 
22 
23 1769 1 





28 1850 1 
28 1861 1 
29 1915 1 
29 1888,1889,1891 3 
30 






37 1995,1996 2 

























2157 1 111 0/95 X 





2400,2405 2 1/19/95 X 
2421,2424 2 1/20/95 X 



























86 3422 1 311 6/95 
86 3427 1 3/16/95 
87 
88 3470 1 3120195 
89 3515 1 3/21/95 
90 3540,3545,3546,3550,3563 5 3/22/95 




























4314,4315 2 5/4/95 X 
4329,4330 2 5/8/95 X 
4357 1 5/10/95 X 
4371,4399,441 6,441 8 4 511 1/95 X 
4420,4426,4473,4487 4 5/12/95 X 
~ ~~ ~~~ 
24 83 2 157 
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APPENDIX C 
SMERFS Session for Critical Client Time to Failure Predictions 
Excerpted (i.e., only the essential instructions for this example have been retained) from the history 
file for critical clients, using ten 5 day failure count intervals to cover the range 1,50). Comments 
are in parentheses to distinguish them from SMERFS input and output. 
ENTER DESIRED DATA TYPE, OR ZERO FOR A LIST. 
THE AVAILABLE INPUT OPTIONS ARE: 
4 (Specifies Failure Count Data) 
1 ASCII FILE INPUT 
2 KEYBOARD INPUT 
3 LIST THE CURRENT DATA 
4 RETURN TO THE MAIN PROGRAM 
ENTER INPUT OPTION. 
2 
A RESPONSE OF NEGATIVE VALUES FOR THE PROMPT: 
"ENTER FAULT COUNT AND TESTING LENGTH", WILL END THE PROCESSING. 
(The count of failures in each 5 day interval is entered for critical clients. See Appendix B. The 
following list is the response of SMERFS to the keyboard input. For example, the fourth keyboard 
entry would be 4 1. Eleven failures total are entered. In SMERFS the interval or "TESTING 
LENGTH" is always "1". In this application, the interval is 5 days) . 
ENTER FAULT COUNT AND TESTING LENGTH. 
ENTER FAULT COUNT AND TESTING LENGTH. 
ENTER FAULT COUNT AND TESTING LENGTH. 
ENTER FAULT COUNT AND TESTING LENGTH. 
ENTER FAULT COUNT AND TESTING LENGTH. 
ENTER FAULT COUNT AND TESTING LENGTH. 
ENTER FAULT COUNT AND TESTING LENGTH. 
ENTER FAULT COUNT AND TESTING LENGTH. 
ENTER FAULT COUNT AND TESTING LENGTH. 
ENTER FAULT COUNT AND TESTING LENGTH. 
ENTER FAULT COUNT AND TESTING LENGTH. 
0.000000000000000E+OOO 1 .OOOOOOOOOOOOOOO 
0.000000000000000E+OOO 1 .OOOOOOOOOOOOOOO 
0.000000000000000E+OOO 1 .OOOOOOOOOOOOOOO 
4.000000000000000 1 .ooooooooooooooo 
1.000000000000000 1 .ooooooooooooooo 
1.000000000000000 1 .ooooooooooooooo 
1.000000000000000 1 .ooooooooooooooo 
0.000000000000000E+OOO 1 .OOOOOOOOOOOOOOO 
2.000000000000000 1 .ooooooooooooooo 
2.000000000000000 1 .ooooooooooooooo 
-1 .ooooooooooooooo -1 .ooooooooooooooo 
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ENTER COUNT MODEL OPTION, OR ZERO FOR A LIST. 
4 (SCHNEIDEWIND MODEL) 
ENTER ONE TO INVESTIGATE FOR THE OPTIMUM S (USING TREATMENT TYPE 
NUMBER 2); ELSE ZERO TO CONTINUE WITH THE MODEL EXECUTION. 
ENTER RANGE OVER WHICH S SHOULD BE TESTED. 
1 
1 10 (1 to 10 5 day intervals) 
S BETA ALPHA WLS MSE-F MSE-T 
- ~ 
4 .11488E+00 .22871E+01 .17785E+01 .11561E+01 .24993E+OO 
(SMERFS was able to compute only one value of "s" for these data but the result is good because 
of the low value of Mean Square Error for Time to Next FaiZure (MSE-T)) 
ENTER DESIRED MODEL TREATMENT "UMBER, OR FOUR TO TERMINATE 
MODEL EXECUTION. 
2 (This "TREATMENT" discards failure data in the range 1,3 for this application) 
ENTER ASSOCIATED VALUE OF S (LESS THAN THE NUMBER OF PERIODS). 
4 
TREATMENT 2 MODEL ESTIMATES ARE: 
BETA .11488E+00 
ALPHA .22871E+O1 
TOTAL NUMBER OF FAULTS .199083+02 (Actual=24. See Appendix B) 
PLUS THOSE SKIPPED .00000E+00 IN PERIODS 1 THROUGH 3 
# OF FAULTS REMAINING .8908 1E+01 (Actual=13: 24 total-11 entered) 
WEIGHTED SUMS-OF-SQUARES 
BETWEEN PREDICTED AND 
OBSERVED FAULTS .17785E+01 
MEAN SQUARE ERROR FOR 
C,UMULATIVE FAULTS .11561E+01 
,MEAN SQUARE ERROR FOR 
TIME TO NEXT FAILURE .24993E+OO 
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THE AVAILABLE FUTURE PREDICTIONS ARE: 
1) THE NUMBER OF FAULTS EXPECTED IN THE NEXT TESTING PERIOD 
2) THE NUMBER OF PERIODS NEEDED TO DISCOVER THE NEXT M FAULTS 
ENTER PREDICTION OPTION, OR ZERO TO END PREDICTIONS. 
2 
ENTER VALUE OF M (BETWEEN ONE AND .89081E+Ol), OR ZERO TO END. 
# OF PERIODS EXPECTED .10365E+01 (1.037 intervals = 5.19 days) 
1 .OOOOOOOOOOOOOOO (One failure) 
ENTER VALUE OF M (BETWEEN ONE AND .89081E+Ol), OR ZERO TO END. 
# OF PERIODS EXPECTED .22133E+Ol (2.213 intervals = 11.07days) 
2.000000000000000 (Two failures) 
ENTER VALUE OF M (BETWEEN ONE AND .89081E+01), OR ZERO TO END. 
# OF PERIODS EXPECTED .35745E+01 (3.575 intervals = 17.88 days) 
.3 .OOOOOOOOOOOOOOO (Three failures) 
ENTER VALUE OF M (BETWEEN ONE AND .89081E+01), OR ZERO TO END. 
.5 1886E+01 
4.000000000000000 (Four failures) 
## OF PERIODS EXPECTED (5.189 intervals = 25.95 days) 
ENTER VALUE OF M (BETWEEN ONE AND .89081E+01), OR ZERO TO END. 
# OF PERIODS EXPECTED .71719E+O1 (7.172 intervals = 35.86 days) 
5 .OOOOOOOOOOOOOOO (Five failures) 
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APPENDIX D 
Edited Computation of Probability of Svstem Failure. Using StatgraDhics, for Failure Scenario of 
Table 7 
Psys=(( 1 -( 1 -Pcc)"Ncc)*((Pnc)"Nnc))+(( 1 -( 1 -Pcs)"Ncs)*((Pns)"Nns)) (Probability of System Failure: 
PCC GETS .005929 
Ncc GETS 5 
Pnc GETS .02025 
Nnc GETS 5 5 4 3 2 1 0 
Pcs GETS .000494 
Ncs GETS 1 





(Load Probability of Critical Client Failure. See Table 3.) 
(Load Number of Critical Clients. See Figures 1 and 2.) 
(Load Probability of Non-Critical Client Failure. See Table 3.) 
(Load Vector of Non-Critical Clients for Failure Scenario of Table 7) 
(Load Probability of Critical Server Failure. See Table 3.) 
(Load Number of Critical Servers. See Figures 1 and 2.) 
(Load Probability of Non-Critical Server Failure. See Table 3) 
(Load Vector of Non-Critical Servers for Failure Scenario of Table 7) 
(Compute Probability of System Failure for Failure Scenario of 
Table 7. These results are entered in Table 9.) 




Defense Technical Information Center 
8725 John J. King Rd., STE 0944 
Ft. Belvoir, VA 22314 
Dudley Knox Library, Code 013 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943 
Office of Research Administration, Code 91 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943 
Department of Systems Management Library, Code SM/Eb 
Naval Postgraduate School 
555 Dyer Rd Rm 239 Bldg. 330 
Monterey, CA 93943 
Commanding Officer 
Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity 
Box 555171 
Camp Pendleton. CA 92055-5171 
Capt. Kenneth Warburton 
Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity 
Box 555171 
Bldg. 31345 
Camp Pendleton, CA 92055-5171 
Dr. Norman F. Schneidewind 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Code SWSs 
Monterey, CA 93943 
No. of Copies 
2 
2 
1 
5 
10 
